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AN OUTSIDER'S
INSIDE VIEW OF THE
CHALLENGER INQUIRY
In the course of diagnosing the technical causes
of the Challenger space shuttle disaster, the author also formed
some impressions of NASA and became acquainted with some
of the pitfalls of participation in an official investigation.
Richard P. Feynman
A few days after the Challenger accident, on a Friday, I got
a call from William Graham, who was the acting director
of NASA. Mr. Graham had been a student of mine—at
Caltech, and also at the Hughes Aircraft Company, where
I gave a series of lectures—and thought maybe I would be
of some use to the investigation. When I heard it would be
in Washington, my immediate reaction was not to do it. I
have a principle of not going anywhere near Washington
or having anything to do with government.
So I called various friends like Al Hibbs and Dick
Davies, trying to find an excuse why I shouldn't accept, but
they all said I should. Then I spoke to my wife. "Look," I
said. "Anybody could do it. They can get somebody else."
"No," said Gweneth. And she explained how she thought I
would make a unique contribution—in a way that I am
modest enough not to describe. Nevertheless, I believed
what she said. So I said, "OK. I'll accept."
So on Sunday, as I went to the telephone to call Mr.
Graham, I announced to Gweneth, "I'm going to commit
suicide for six months. I won't be able to do any work with
this physics problem I've been having fun with; I'm going
to do nothing but work on the shuttle—for six months." I
want you to understand my attitude at the time: I hadn't
realized that it would take two years to get the shuttle
flying again. I was going to try to work very hard so we
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could get everything straightened out as quickly as
possible.
The next day, Monday, I got a telephone call at 4 pm:
"Mr. Feynman, you have been accepted onto the commis-
sion"—which by that time was a "Presidential" commis-
sion, headed by former Secretary of State William P.
Rogers. The first meeting would be in Washington, on
Wednesday. So Tuesday, I asked Al Hibbs to get people at
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory who knew something about
the shuttle project to brief me on it right away. I want to
say right now that I got nothing but wonderful cooperation
from JPL, and that briefing was fantastic.
In order to prove how successful it was, I'll show you
the first page of the notes I made in the briefing. (See the
figure on the facing page.) You'll find that on the second
line it says, "O-rings show scorching in clevis check." That
means hot gas had burned through the O-rings on several
occasions. Furthermore, they told me that the zinc
chromate putty had bubbles, or holes. It turned out that
yes, indeed, through those holes the gas came in to erode
the O-rings. So already, on the second line of my briefing, I
was told what was the matter with the shuttle.
The guys at JPL gave me a lot of other information.
They told me about the engines, which are remarkable
devices in the sense that the engineering involved is very
good. They are way beyond normal. They are the most
powerful engines for their weight that have ever been
built. NASA was claiming that the engines were in the
regular range of engineering, but they're not; the engines
had many difficulties that the guys at JPL told me about.
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O-ring scorching already was recognized as a key ro rhe Challenger
disaster in Feynman's very firsr briefing, which rook place or rhe Jer
Propulsion Laborarory on 4 February 1986. Shown here is rhe firsr page
of his nores; rhe O-rmg problem appears in rhe second line.
(I found out later that the people who worked on the
engines always had their fingers crossed on each flight,
and the moment they saw the shuttle explode, they were
all sure it was the engines. But of course, the TV replay
showed a flame coming out of one of the solid rocket
boosters.)
Anyway, the point is that I got briefed. And this was
done with lots of energy, just like the old days at Los
Alamos, one guy after the other: first the rocket, then the
engines and so forth. A guy would say, "We don't know
about that; Lifer knows about that. Let's get Chuck Lifer
in on this." So it was a very intensive briefing, the kind of
thing I love, and I sucked up all the information like a
sponge. I'm all set to go to Washington, and I go to
Washington. (By the way, I took the "red-eye" across the
country so I could stay here on Tuesday to learn about the
shuttle. But the red-eye I never took again—you're so
sleepy when you get there.)
I check into the Holiday Inn early Wednesday
morning, I get into a taxi, and read the address of Mr. Rog-
ers's office to the driver. We start off. Mr. Rogers's office
was supposed to be near the hotel somewhere—the hotel
was located near the Capitol and near everything big—but
we go on and on, further and further, into worse and worse
territory, until we finally find the address—by interpola-
tion between two numbers. It was an empty lot there, with
no number on it.
So now, what to do? I asked the taxi driver to go all
the way back over this whole distance. (Meanwhile, my
secretary tells me, she got a call from Washington:
"Where is he?") Then I noticed that my hotel was right
across the street from NASA. Perfect. Right across the
street. (In fact, it was also across a different street, on the
other corner, from where the commission later had its
offices.)
I thought, "What the hell, NASA's right across the
street. I'll go to NASA. Somebody there must know
where the meeting is." So I went into NASA, up to Mr.
Graham's office, and somebody knew. They showed me
the room. There, the room was full of people. There were
television lights and everything, and all I could do was
squash in the back and think, "How the hell am I gonna
get to the front where I belong?" I worried about this for a
while. Then I overheard a little bit about what they were
saying, and it was evidently a different subject!
In the meantime, somebody from Mr. Graham's office
had found the location of Mr. Rogers's office by phoning
around and came down to get me. I finally made it to Mr.
Rogers's law offices a few blocks away, where I met the
other commissioners. Over the course of the commission,
we all became very good friends. We worked very hard
together. This first meeting was the beginning of a very
effective commission—with the exception of Mr. Chuck
Yeager, who came to one meeting for about a half an hour
and then absented himself from the commission in order
to be free so he could make criticisms of it.
First meetings
Well, this first meeting was just a get-together. But Mr.
Rogers did discuss the importance of our relationship to
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the press and how we have to be very careful with the
press. "I know Washington," he kept saying. "We have to
proceed in an orderly manner and be careful of leaks to the
press."
The next meeting we had, on Thursday, was a public
meeting—to start things off right with the press. By the
way, we arrived at that meeting in limousines. We never
got limousines again, but this time we arrived in limou-
sines. I sat in the front seat. The driver says to me, "I un-
derstand a lot of very important, famous people are
coming to this meeting.. . ."
"Yeah, I s'pose. . . . "
"Well, I collect signatures," he says. "Could you do
me a favor . . . "
"Sure," I say.
I'm reaching for my pen when he continues, " . . . and
find Mr. Armstrong for me, so I can get his signature?"
There are always greater people.
That meeting was a public briefing. A briefing in a
public meeting is almost impossibly inefficient, because
other people ask questions, and they're not the questions
you want to ask, and you've got to sit through all that, and
so on, and so on. It's very ineffective, and I began to learn
how boring such things can be. The NASA officials were
telling me only a small fraction of all the things I had
learned at JPL two days before.
We had all come to the meeting in limousines, and
when we came out, some of the limousines were still there.
One of the commissioners was a general, General Kutyna,
who looked very handsome and very impressive in his
uniform. But what impressed me was his request:
"Where is the nearest Metro station?" Right away I liked
him, and I found out that my judgment in this case was ex-
cellent.
That night I wrote out for myself what kinds of
questions I thought we should ask and all the things I
wanted to study. I laid out the whole business, hoping to
see what the rest of the commission wanted to do in our
next meeting.
The next day, Friday, was more effective. General
Kutyna told us in considerable detail what an accident
investigation was like and how it was done, using the Titan
missile as an example. I was very impressed with this. I
was happy to learn that most of the questions I was going
to ask were the kinds of questions one should ask, except
that the investigation should be done in a much more
methodical fashion than I had imagined.
At the end of this discourse, Mr. Rogers, who is not a
technical man, said, "Yes, your investigation was a
wonderful success, but we can't use those methods on our
flight because we can't get as much information as you had
on yours." That was patently false, because the shuttle,
having people in it, was monitored much more carefully,
so we had enormously more information than they had on
the Titan. So there wasn't any doubt that we could do it.
In the meeting Mr. Rogers asked each of us how much
time we could spend working on the commission. Many of
the commissioners were retired, so they could spend 100
percent of their time. I also said I could spend 100 percent;
I had everything arranged here at Caltech. (Nobody at
Caltech ever said a word to me that I was shirking my
work here, and I appreciate that.)
I tried very hard to get something to do. In the
meeting I kept explaining that public briefings don't work
with me; I have to talk to the technical people directly.
Mr. Rogers explained that we were going down to Kennedy
Space Center in Florida on the following Thursday. Then
we would start our investigation.
Next Thursday! I wanted to get going much quicker
than that, and kept explaining that I could work much
more efficiently if I went on my own and talked to
people directly, and I kept mentioning different things
I'd like to do. Then the meeting would be interrupted by
a letter coming in for Mr. Rogers, or something. He
would read it—during which time various other commis-
sion members would whisper to me, "I'd like to work
with you if you get a job"—and then Mr. Rogers would
look up, apparently forgetting that I had been talking,
and call on somebody else.
Finally, I would get the floor again. I would start
my stuff again, and there would be another "accident."
The meeting stopped while I was still talking, and the
last words were by Mr. Armstrong, the vice chairman.
He said we wouldn't be doing any of the detailed
investigative work. Well, the only thing I'm any good at
is detailed work!
I was devastated. I was depressed and very uncomfor-
table. After the meeting I went up to Mr. Rogers. "Look,"
I said. "We've got nothing to do for five days!"
He said, "Well, what would you have done if you
hadn't been on the commission?"
"I would have gone to Boston to consult for the
Thinking Machines Company."
"Well, you go to Boston to consult, and come back in
five days."
I couldn't take that. I was wound up like a spring,
ready to go to work. I had intended to "commit suicide"—
do nothing else but work for the commission—for six
months, and I had nothing to do. I was very depressed. I
left that meeting feeling terrible.
NASA briefing
Soon I thought of something. I called up Mr. Graham, and
said, "Listen, Bill, we're not doing anything for five davsl I
want to get started! I want to DO something!"
He says, "Sure! You could go to Johnson, where they
take the telemetry; you could go to Marshall, where they
make the engines; or you could go to Kennedy."
I didn't want to go to Kennedy, because it would look
like I was trying to get information before the rest of the
commission did. That was not what I was trying to do; I
just wanted to get started. Sally Ride had said she wanted
to work with me if I got something to do, and I knew she
was at Johnson, so I said I'd go there.
So Graham says, "That's fine, you can do that. I know
David Acheson, who's on the commission. He's a good
friend of Rogers. I'll call him and see what he thinks."
About half an hour later, Mr. Acheson calls me: "I think
it's a great idea, but I can't convince Rogers. Rogers
refuses to say why he's against it, and I just don't know
why I can't convince him that you should get started."
Meanwhile, Mr. Graham thought of a compromise:
He would bring people into NASA headquarters, there in
Washington, to brief me the next day, on Saturday. But
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Recommendations
The lack of a good secondary seal in the field joint is most critical and ways to
reduce joint rotation should be incorporated as soon as possible to reduce
criticality
The flow conditions in the joint areas during ignition and motor operation need
to be established through cold flow modeling to eliminate O-ring erosion
QM-5 static test should be used to qualify a second source of the only flight
certified joint filler material (asbestos-filled vacuum putty) to protect the flight
program schedule
VLS-1 should use the only flight certified joint filler material (Randolph
asbestos-filled vacuum putty) in all joints
Additional hot and cold subscale tests need to be conducted to improve
analytical modeling of O-ring erosion problem and for establishing margins of
safety for eroded O-rings
Analysis of existing data indicates that it i<: continue flying existing
aesiqn as long^s all joints are leak checked with a 200 psig stabilization
pressure, are free_pf contamination in the seal areas and meet O-ring squeeze
requirements
Efforts needs to continue at an accelerated pace to eliminate SRM seal erosion
This NASA report wirh recommendarions on rhe shurrle was shown ro Feynman during o NASA
briefing Feynman sensed o conrrodicrion between rhe firsr and sixrh poinrs, which he underlined,
as shown here.
Mr. Rogers called me up and said he didn't want me to do
that. He kept explaining that we have to proceed in an or-
derly manner. I tried to explain how a technical person
can talk to another technical person and get information
very quickly, and that I wanted to DO something! I
complained that we had had several meetings by now, but
we hadn't yet discussed who was going to do what, or how
to get started on the investigation.
Mr. Rogers said, "Well, do you want me to bother
everybody and bring them together again for a meeting on
Monday to discuss this?"
I said, "Yes!"
So he dropped the subject. Then he said, "I've heard
you don't like your hotel. Let me put you in a good hotel."
I told him everything was fine with the hotel, and that
I was perfectly satisfied with it. I just wanted to get to
work! But he tried again, so I had to tell him, "Mr. Rogers,
I am not interested in my personal comfort, only in the
ability to do something!"
He said, "OK, go to NASA. It's OK." That's where
our conversation ended.
So, I went. I got a private briefing all day at NASA on
the engines and on the seals. The briefing on the seals was
by Mr. Weeks. It was a continuation of my JPL briefing,
with many more details, including the history of these
matters: how the problem had been discovered very early,
how there had been "burn-throughs," "erosion," "blow-
bys" and what not, on flight after flight—how many there
were, and how each flight readiness review had looked at
the information and decided it was all right to fly.
At the end of this long report on the problem of the
seals, there was a page with recommendations. This is
how all information is communicated in NASA—by
writing everything down behind little black circles, called
"bullets." (See the figure above.)
When I looked at the recommendations, the thing that
struck me was the contradiction between two of the
bullets: The first one says, "The lack of a good secondary
seal in the field joint is most critical. Ways to reduce the
effects should be incorporated as soon as possible to reduce
criticality." Then, further down the page, it says, "Analy-
sis of existing data indicates that it is safe to continue
flying with existing design . . . "—with some other condi-
tions, such as using 200 lbs of pressure in the leak test. (By
the way, we discovered later that the leak test itself was
causing the holes in the putty and was part of the reason
for the failure of the seals!)
I pointed out this contradiction and said, "What
analysis?" It was some kind of computer model. A
computer model that determines the degree to which a
piece of rubber will burn in a complex situation like that—
is something I don't believe in!
I also found out that the matters that were causing
trouble were brought up only at the "flight readiness
review," where they were deciding whether to fly or not.
There are so many considerations in deciding whether to
fly, yet they brought up these critical matters only under
those circumstances. In between the flights, there was no
discussion of the problem—how it's going along or whether
there's some progress.
So, what was really happening was that NASA had
developed an attitude: If the seals leaked a little and the
flight was successful, it meant that the seal situation
wasn't serious. Therefore, the seals could leak and it
would be all right—it was no worse than the time before.
Such an attitude is, of course, extremely dangerous.
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One or two out of five seals leaked—and only some of the
time—so it's obviously a probabilistic matter, a thing you
have no control over, an uncertainty. And it's not obvious
that the next time you fly, the uncertainty won't click over
a little bit more, statistically, and the seal will fail. Try
playing Russian roulette that way: You pull the trigger
and it doesn't go off, so it must be OK to do it again, right?
Brittle rubber
The next morning, Sunday, Mr. Graham took me with his
family to the National Air and Space Museum. There we
saw a moving picture about NASA, and it was so well done
that I almost cried when I saw all the people involved at
every level, how enthusiastic everybody was and how
eager they were to make things work. That made me even
more determined to help straighten things out as quickly
as possible and to talk to the shuttle assembly people, the
engineers and everybody else low enough down.
Later that day, General Kutyna called me up on the
telephone. "I was working on my carburetor, and I was
thinking. You're a professor," he says. "What, sir, is the
effect of cold on the rubber seals?"
I caught on immediately to what he was thinking of.
The temperature was 29° when the shuttle flew, and the
coldest previous launch was 53°. I said, "You know as well
as I do. It gets stiff and loses its resiliency." That gave me
a clue. Of course, that's all he had to tell me, and it was a
clue for which I got a lot of credit later. But it was his idea.
The professor of physics always has to be told what to look
for. You just use your knowledge to answer the questions.
That weekend, The New York Times put out an article
about a man named Cook, who was in the budget
department of NASA. Mr. Cook had written a letter to his
superior a year earlier, saying that the engineers knew
there was something wrong with the seals, that they might
have to fix the problem, and it might be expensive. Mr.
Cook was working out the budget and recommended that
NASA prepare for the contingency that it would suddenly
need a big load of money to fix this problem of the seals.
This gets into The New York Times, and so we have to
have a special meeting. It's the press, you see; we have to
match the press. So on Monday, everybody was called to a
meeting anyway! But I remind you, we still hadn't had
any meetings in which we did any work. At this
emergency closed meeting, we got some interesting
information: The NASA people who had been looking at
the television pictures of the launch saw preliminary
indications that there was smoke coming out of one of the
joints just at liftoff.
More interesting still was a report by a man named
MacDonald from the Morton Thiokol Company, who came
to the meeting on his own. He said that the Thiokol
Company engineers had noticed the low temperature, had
been worrying about the seals, had known about the
resilience not being there. Furthermore, they knew that
when it is cold, the grease in the seals is very viscous so it
can't move fast enough to close the gaps. The engineers
were very, very worried about it just before the flight and
reported to the people at Marshall that they should not fly
below 53° temperature, and that night it was 29°. But the
engineers were told that that was an appalling decision,
that they should think it over again, and they were given
some apparently logical reason.
We later learned that in the discussions inside
Thiokol, the engineers were still saying, "We shouldn't
fly," but the managers made a decision nevertheless to go
ahead and fly, and then they gave the usual, apparently
logical reason, which was—never mind, I couldn't ever
understand it. It's hopeless.
At any rate, that morning I had asked the question
about how resilient the rubber is, and, as always, NASA
was very cooperative at giving me information. That
afternoon I got a stack of papers, the first page of which
said, "Mr. Feynman of the commission wants to know
about the resiliency of the O-ring rubber at low tempera-
tures . . . "—and it's sent to the next subordinate. The
subordinate writes to another subordinate, "Mr. Feynman
of the Presidential commission wants to know . . . " and so
on, down the line. In the middle there's a paper with the
answer, and then there's a series of papers—the submis-
sion papers—which explain that "this is in answer to your
request at such-and-such a time."
So I get this stack of papers, just like a sandwich, and
in the middle the answer is given to the wrong question!
The answer I got was: when you squeeze the rubber for two
hours at a certain temperature and pressure, what
happens when you let go—how long it takes to creep
back—over hours. And I was talking about fractions of a
second during launch when the gap in the field joint is sud-
denly changing. So the information was of no use.
Public experiment
We were going to have a public meeting the next day. I
was already getting tired of these public meetings and
briefings because they were so time consuming and of so
little use. I thought, "Now we're going to have an open
meeting, and we're going to say exactly the same things
that we did in the closed meeting." (It was a good idea:
Mr. Rogers wanted to keep the public informed, so every
time we discovered something, we would quickly have an
open meeting to bring out the new material.) But I
thought, "It's like an act: We have to hear the same things
in the open meetings as in the closed meetings, and we
won't learn anything new. And the information I got from
NASA about the rubber is useless."
Later I'm feeling lousy and I'm eating dinner; I look at
the table, and there's a glass of ice water. I think, "Damn
it, / can find out about that rubber without sending notes
to NASA and getting back a stack of papers; all I've got to
do is get a sample of the rubber, stick it in ice water and see
how it responds when I squeeze it! That way, I can learn
something new in a public meeting!"
I ask NASA for a piece of the rubber. It's impossible
to get; they're very, very careful, and every piece of
material is checked and counted and everything else, so
you can't just go down to the stockroom and pick up a piece
of rubber. But Mr. Graham remembered there were two
pieces of the rubber in the field joint model NASA had
shown us before and was going to use again in the open
meeting. The two pieces of rubber were the real thing,
about an inch and a half long each. We decided to meet in
Mr. Graham's office the next morning before the meeting
to see if I could take the model apart. (In the open meeting
I would have to take the model apart quickly.)
The next morning I get up early. I come out of the ho-
tel—it's snowing a little bit—and I'm dressed up in my suit
because I'm going to the public meeting later. A taxi
comes up, and I say to the driver, "I want to go to a hard-
ware store."
He says, "A hardware store? There's no hardware
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The O-Ring Problem and Thiokol's Attempted Solution
Solid rocket booster
Shim
The cross secrion of the solid rocker booster (top left) shows rhe rubber O-rings rhor encircle rhe rocker or rhe joinrs. The O-rings ore op-
proximorely o quorrer of on inch Thick and lie on a circle 12 ft in diomerer—rhar's somerhing like 37 ft around. When rhe booster original-
ly was designed by rhe Morton Thiokol Company, it was expected that the pressure from the rocker would squash rhe O-rings so rhe joint
would be secutely sealed. What happened instead is, the joint is stronger rhon rhe wall (it's three rimes thicker) so rhar under pressure rhe
woll bows outward, causing rhe joint to open o little—enough to lift rhe rubber O-nngs off rhe seal areo.
Alrhough rhe pieces of rubber are called O-rings, rhey're nor used the woy O-rings are normally used. In ordinary circumsrances, such
as for sealing oil in rhe motor of on ouromobile, while thete ore sliding ports and rorarmg shofts, the gaps are always rhe same. An O-ting
just sits there in a fixed position. Duf in the case of the shuttle, rhe gop expands as the pressure builds up in rhe rocker. And ro mainrain
rhe seal, rhe rubber has ro expand fosr enough ro close rhe gap—in fracrions of o second Thus rhe resilience of rhe rubber became a
very essential porr of rhe design. When the Thiokol engineers were discovering these problems, rhey went to the Parker Seal Company,
which manufactures rhe rubbet, ro ask for advice The Parker Seal Company rold Thiokol rhot O-rings were nor meant ro be used rhar
woy, and so rhey could give no advice.
Alrhough ir was known from nearly rhe beginning thar rhe joinr was nor working as ir was designed ro, Thiokol kept struggling wirh
the device. They made o number of makeshift improvemenrs. One was ro pur shims in to keep the joint tight (rop right). At firsr
rhey rhoughr they would adjust each shim ro rhe nghr thickness as they went around (the rocker would become slighrly our of round
after each use), bur rhar was expensive, so rhey made all the shims the same thickness. Of course, ir wosn'r enough. The joinr still
leaked, and they were rhinking how ro fix it, and the shuttle kept flying. Thar is one of rhe rhings you have ro undersrand; The pro-
gram kepr going, no morrer what. —RPF
stores here. The Capitol is just up the street—we're in
downtown Washington!" Then he remembered where he
had seen a hardware store once, some distance away, and
we went there. It didn't open till 8:30—it was about 8:15—
so I waited outside, in my suit coat and tie, a costume I had
assumed since I came to Washington in order to move
among the natives without being too conspicuous.
The suit coats that the natives wear inside their
buildings (which are well heated) are sufficient for
walking from one building to another, or from a building
to a taxi, if the distances are too great. (All the taxis are
heated.) But I observed that the natives seem to have a
strange fear of the cold: On top of their suit coats they put
on overcoats if they wish to step outside. I hadn't bought
an overcoat yet, so I was still rather conspicuous standing
outside the hardware store in the snow.
When the hardware store opened, I bought myself
some screwdrivers, pliers, clamps and so on, because I
wasn't sure exactly what I would need.
When I got to NASA I began thinking the clamps were
too big to put into a glass. So to get some small clamps I
went to the medical department of NASA, where I had
gone several times before (my cardiologist was trying to
take care of me by telephone). I went up to Graham's
office. He was very cooperative, as always, and we saw
that I could open the model very easily with just a pair of
pliers. So there was the rubber, right in my hand, and al-
though I knew it would be more dramatic and honest to do
the experiment directly in the meeting, I cheated—I
couldn't resist. I tried it. And, after all, it would be quite a
flop it if didn't work! So, following the example of having a
closed meeting before an open meeting I must tell you I
discovered it worked before I did it in the open meeting.
I kept wanting to do my experiment all during the
meeting, but General Kutyna, who was sitting next to me,
gave me advice. He had given me advice before. At the
first public meeting he had leaned over and said, "Copilot
to pilot: Comb your hair." So now he was saying, "Copilot
to pilot: Not now!"
So when he told me, "Now!" I did it, and everything
went all right. As you probably know, I demonstrated that
the rubber had no resilience whatever when you squeezed
it at that temperature, and that it was very likely a partial
cause of the accident. We all agreed later that that, in
fact, was true.
On Wednesday, 12 February, we had no meeting, so I
wrote a letter home. I told my wife she was right, that in
certain ways I was unique. One of the ways I was unique
was that I was not connected to any organization—I had
no weakness from that point of view. I was, of course,
connected with Caltech, but that's not a weakness! For
example, General Kutyna was in the Air Force, so he
couldn't say everything exactly the way he wanted,
because he might get in trouble with the Air Force. Sally
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Ride still had a job at NASA. Everyone on the commission
had some kind of connection and therefore some kind of
weakness, but I was apparently invincible.
But General Kutyna warned me that when they fly
airplanes, they have a rule: Check six. Most airplanes are
shot down this way: A guy is flying along, looking in all di-
rections, and feeling very safe. An airplane flies up behind
him (at "six o'clock"; "twelve o'clock" is directly in front),
and he gets hit. So you always have to check six o'clock.
So I began to write, "Check six!" on every note paper I had
and developed a kind of paranoia.
For example, I have a cousin who previously had
been with the Associated Press as White House corre-
spondent and is now with CNN; I also have a nephew who
works for The Washington Post. When I had some time I
would visit with them—eating dinner, and so on. It was
very pleasant, but we made sure we never said a word
about anything I was doing, because I didn't want to be
responsible for any leaks. I told Mr. Rogers that I had
these associations with the press. He smiled and said,
"It's perfectly all right. I used to work for so-and-so"—he
had some connection with the press too. He just laughed;
there was no problem. But my paranoia had developed to
such a point that I thought, "That was too easy; he's going
to get me that way!" So I stopped seeing my cousin. That
was stupid: There were no problems; it was just my state
of mind.
I did, however, keep talking to the press—openly,
always giving my name. I didn't want any hocus-pocus
about "unidentified sources," or anything. My cousin had
taught me that the press is not something to be afraid of,
and it turns out to be true. I found that out several times.
The first time was when The New York Times put out an
article after I did the ice water experiment; during the
public meeting I had no time to explain what its meaning
and importance were, but they had it all explained
perfectly.
Another time, NBC interviewed me—they caught me
in the lobby of my hotel. They interviewed me for 15 to 20
minutes—the lady reporter was very short and very nice—
and I talked in my usual, careful, professional way, with
all the caveats and so forths and so ons. I saw the
interview later on the "Nightly News": I was on for about
two seconds—I say something, and BOOM!—it's over. But
it was good: The report carried the line of what I said, and
the reporter put the context around it, saying things like,
"The professor went on to say that this was only the result
of a mathematical model and might be uncertain"—stuff
like that. It was excellent. It was very short, carefully put
together and excellent—except for one thing: Because I'm
not experienced, I didn't look into the camera when I
spoke. Instead, it looked like I was talking to my dog.
Visit to Kennedy
Well, finally, on Thursday, we get to Kennedy. The main
briefing turned out to be the way I thought it would be—
we didn't get any useful information just looking around
at the "gee-whiz" place. But before that, we had two
meetings in which we got a lot of information. We got a de-
tailed look at the pictures of the smoke, which made it very
apparent that the leak of gases through the seal had
started immediately after ignition, then somehow plugged
itself up temporarily, and finally ended up with a flame
coming through. We also got all the details on the
Thiokol-Marshall discussions, in which the engineers
never changed their minds; only the manager did, under
pressure from Marshall.
After two days at Kennedy, we were supposed to
return to Washington. I thought, "Now, at last, here I am.
Now I've got a chance to talk to everybody."
I told Mr. Rogers I wanted to stay at Kennedy, and he
said, "I'd prefer that you didn't stay down here, but of
course you can do whatever you want."
I said, "Well, OK, then, I'll stay."
So I stayed at Kennedy a few more days. I ran around
and found out more about the pictures from the photo-
graph guys; I found out about the ice that had been on the
launch pad from the ice crew. They told me they had
gotten some funny numbers for the temperature on the
morning of the launch, and we discussed what was wrong.
We called up the people who made the instrument, and
tried to find out how the instrument was built so we could
understand the errors, but they suddenly clammed up,
obviously afraid that they were going to be blamed for the
shuttle disaster.
I explained to the manufacturer that the instruments
were not used in accordance with their manual (they had
been used too soon after being taken out of the box), and we
wanted to know what the effect of that misuse would be on
the apparent temperature readings, and so forth. I finally
got them to explain it all. They said our errors were
reproducible. So we set up an experiment in which we
reproduced the circumstances, and we corrected the
temperature readings. I'm only trying to say I was
working hard.
Another thing came up while I was running around
down there at Kennedy. I had predicted that Mr. Rogers
was going to try to fix me by overloading me—by giving
me a lot of stuff to do. Sure enough, it happened; the
commission staff in Washington kept sending me things
to do. But as the instructions came in, I had done them
already—they didn't realize how fast I am at getting
information and understanding it and going on to the
next thing.
The only thing they sent me that I didn't do had to do
with a certain memo whose existence they had discovered.
During the assembly of the solid rocket boosters, someone
had written cavalierly, "Let's go for it!" The staff didn't
like the attitude on the part of the workers, and they
wanted to find that piece of paper. By that time I knew
how much paper there was in NASA so I was sure it was a
trick to make me get lost and to do nothing. So I did noth-
ing about it.
Meeting with workers
I talked to Mr. Lamberth, who was in charge of the
assembly of the SRBs. He told me about the problems he
had with the workmen. They had a little accident earlier,
and he had to discipline them about it, and then he told me
about another incident: The SRBs become a little bit out
of round after each use. When the workers were trying to
make the rocket round again with the rounding ma-
chine—a rod with a hydraulic press on one end and a nut
on the other—they were only supposed to go up to 1250 lbs,
according to the manual. But they couldn't get it
squashed enough that way, so they took a wrench and
tightened the nut on the other end of the rod to squeeze it
some more. That made the rocket round, all right, but one
of the workmen noticed that the pressure had gone up to
1350 lbs that way. Well, a gauge measures the force
applied to a rod from either end, so tightening the nut
increases the pressure past 1250 lbs, of course! So Mr.
Lamberth admonished the workers to follow the manual.
He said the workers weren't like they used to be, and he
was very disturbed.
So I go down and talk to the workers. First of all, I'm
surprised to find that the foreman doesn't know anything
about this admonishment. He knew about the 1350 lbs,
but he didn't know he had been admonished. He said, "No,
we weren't admonished; we were following the procedures
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in the manual." Sure enough, the manual said to tighten
the nut after the pressure reaches 1250 lbs—it said so in
black and white! It didn't say that tightening the nut
would increase the pressure; the people who wrote the
manual probably weren't quite aware of that. So the
workmen had, in fact, followed the manual perfectly. (I
later found out that as a result, the manual was revised to
allow for higher pressure, and that only the hydraulic jack
was to be used to increase the pressure. The step about
tightening the nut was eliminated.)
So Mr. Lamberth really didn't know what happened
underneath. He said he had admonished the workmen,
but he never talked to them directly. So he had the idea
that his workmen were no longer like they used to be, but I
tell you, they really were. They had a lot of information
but no way to communicate it. The workmen knew a lot.
They had noticed all kinds of problems and had all kinds of
ideas on how to fix them, but no one had paid much
attention to them. The reason was: Any observations had
to be reported in writing, and a lot of these guys didn't
know how to write good memos. But they had good
knowledge, they worked very hard and they were very
enthusiastic.
While I was doing my work down at Kennedy, Mr.
Rogers was in Washington appearing before a Congres-
sional committee. (Congress was considering whether to
set up its own investigation of the accident.) Senator
Hollings said, "So who have ya got, there, on your
commission? Ya got a couple of astronauts, a Nobel
prizewinner, a general, some businessman and a couple of
lawyers. What you really need is gumshoes, who will be
right down there at Kennedy, eating lunch with the very
guys who do the work on the shuttle."
And Mr. Rogers was able to reply, "You'll be
interested to know, Senator, that the Nobel prizewinner is
down there at Kennedy, right now, doing exactly that!"
(Although Mr. Rogers couldn't have known it, I was
actually eating lunch with some of the engineers at
exactly that time.) So Mr. Rogers gradually realized I
wasn't quite so useless. We got to respect each other very
much—I think he ultimately respected me, and I certainly
do respect him for his abilities.
I went back to Washington, and I got into more and
more difficulties. The next meeting we had was a public
meeting, and I was questioning Mr. Lund of the Thiokol
Company, who had changed his mind about launching the
shuttle. Somebody at Marshall had told him to put on his
"management hat" instead of his "engineering hat," and
so he changed his opinion. I was asking him, "Don't you
understand the principles of probability?" when suddenly
I had this feeling of the Inquisition.
Mr. Rogers had pointed out to us that we ought to be
careful with these people, whose careers depended on us.
He said, "We have all the advantages. We're sitting up
here, they're sitting down there; they have to answer our
questions, we don't have to anwer their questions. It isn't
fair." Suddenly all this came back to me and I felt terrible.
I couldn't do it the next day, so I went back to California,
just for a day or two, to rest up.
While I was in Pasadena, I went over to JPL and
discussed the enhancement of the pictures with Jerry
Solomon and Meemong Lee; they were studying the flame
that had appeared on the side of the SRB just before the
main fuel tank exploded. I had just been in Washington,
hearing the NASA managers talk through a fog. What a
difference—just like with the photograph guys and the ice
crew at Kennedy, everything was so direct and simple at
Caltech and JPL. What a difference!
Communication problem
We finally divided into working groups, and I went to
Marshall with General Kutyna's group. The first thing
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that happened there was, a range safety officer by the
name of Ulian came to tell us about a discussion he had
had with NASA higher-ups about safety. Mr. Ulian had to
decide whether to put explosive charges on the side so
ground control could destroy the shuttle in case it was
falling onto a city. The big cheeses at NASA said, "Don't
put any explosives on, because the shuttle is so safe. It'll
never fall onto a city."
Mr. Ulian tried to argue that there was danger. One
out of every 25 rockets had failed previously, so Mr. Ulian
estimated the probability of danger to be about 1 in 100—
enough to jusify the explosive charges. But the higher-ups
at NASA said that the probability of failure was 1 in
100 000. That means if you flew the shuttle every day, the
average time before your first accident would be 300
years—every day, one flight, for 300 years—which is
obviously crazy! Mr. Ulian also told us about the problems
he had with the big cheeses—how they didn't come to the
meetings sometimes and all kinds of other details.
Then I thought of this question: By now we had found
out that the flight failed because one of the seals had
broken, and the higher-ups had told us they didn't know
anything about the seals problem—even though I was able
to find out about it right away at JPL, before I even went to
Washington. We saw that NASA had no system for fixing
the problem, even though engineers were writing letters
like, "HELP!" and "This is a RED ALERT!" Nothing was
happening. My question was: Does this lack of communi-
cation between engineers and management also exist in
other places? I thought, "I oughta find out whether this is
a characteristic of the whole system, or whether it's true
just for Morton Thiokol, and we happened to find out
about it because the O-rings busted." So I told the people
at Marshall I wanted to find out about the engines. I
wanted to talk to a couple of engineers without any
managers around.
"Yes, sir, we'll fix it up. How about tomorrow
morning at 9:00?"
The next day I come in, and there's engineers, all
right, but there's also managers, and a great, big book:
Presentation Made on February Such-and-Such to Commis-
sioner Richard P. Feynman—all prepared during the
night.
"Geez! It's so much work!" I said.
"No, it's not so much work; we just put the regular pa-
pers in that we use all the time."
The engine is extremely complex and hard to under-
stand, and the engineers were explaining to me how it
worked, showing slide after slide. I asked my usual dumb-
sounding questions.
After a while, Mr. Lovingood, a middle manager
there, said, "Mr. Feynman, we've been going for two hours
now. There are 123 pages, and we've only covered 20."
"It's all right, don't worry," I said. "I'm confident
that it'll go faster as we go along, but I want my
questions answered at the beginning. Otherwise, I can't
understand it."
Suddenly I got an idea. I said, "All right, I'll tell you
what. In order to save time, the main question I want to
know is this: Is there the same understanding, or
difference of understanding, between the engineers and
the management associated with the engines as we have
discovered associated with the solid rocket boosters?"
Mr. Lovingood says, "No, of course not. Although I'm
now a manager, I was trained as an engineer."
I gave each person a piece of paper. I said, "Now, each
of you please write down what you think the probability of
failure for a flight is, due to a failure in the engines."
I got four answers—three from the engineers and one
from Mr. Lovingood, the manager. The answers from the
engineers all said, in one form or another (the usual way
engineers write—"reliability limit," or "confidence sub
so-on"), almost exactly the same thing: 1 in about 200. Mr.
Lovingood's answer said, "Cannot quantify. Reliability is
determined by studies of this, checks on that, experience
here"—blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.
"Well," I said, "I've got four answers. One of them
weaseled." I turned to Mr. Lovingood and said, "I think
you weaseled."
He says, "I don't think I weaseled."
"Well, look," I said. "You didn't tell me what your
confidence was; you told me how you determined it. What
I want to know is: After you determined it, what was it?"
He says, "100 percent." The engineers'jaws drop. My
jaw drops. I look at him, everybody looks at him—and he
says, "Uh . .. uh, minus epsilon?"
"OK. Now the only problem left is, what is epsilon?"
He says, "1 in 100 000." So I showed Mr. Lovingood
the other answers and said, "I see there is a difference
between engineers and management in their information
and knowledge here, just as there was in the case of the
rocket, but let me not bother you about it; let's continue
with the engine."
So they continued telling me about the engine, and
soon I understood how it worked. Then they told me about
all the problems they had had with it—blades cracking,
and all kinds of other difficulties. And I discovered the
same game, just as in the case of the solid rocket boosters,
of reducing criteria and accepting more and more errors
that weren't designed into the device.
Later I also checked the avionics, the software NASA
uses on its computers for controlling the shuttle from
launch to landing, to find out if a similar situation existed
there. But in this case, on the contrary, everything was
very good; the engineers and the managers communicated
well with each other, and they were all very careful not to
change their criteria of acceptance during flight reviews. I
found the avionics completely satisfactory.
Writing report
I wrote up what I found out about these things into a
special report, hoping that the other members would see it
for discussion. I sent it to Al Keel, the executive officer
whom Mr. Rogers had selected to coordinate everything on
the commission. He told me on the telephone that he had
received it and that he would show it to everybody.
By this time we were beginning to write up our part of
the main report about the accident. General Kutyna had
set up a whole system at Marshall for doing so. It lasted
about two days before we got a message from Mr. Rogers:
"Come back to Washington. You shouldn't do the writing
down there." So we went back to Washington, and Mr.
Graham lent me an office and a secretary who was very,
very good. I helped our group write up its part of the main
report—with a lot of input from Mr. Keel.
All this time I had expected that we would be meeting
in Washington to discuss what we had found out so far, to
think it out together and look at it from different
perspectives—in addition to the astronauts there were
lawyers and industralists, there were scientists and
engineers, and so on—and to discuss with each other
where to go next. But in our meetings, all we ever did was
what they called "wordsmithing"—correcting punctua-
tion, refining phrases and so on. We never had a real
discussion of ideas!
Besides the wordsmithing, we discussed the typo-
graphy and the color of the cover. At each meeting we
were asked to vote, so I thought it would be efficient to vote
for the same color we had decided on in the meeting
before—but it turned out I was always in the minority!
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We finally chose red. It came out blue.
At any rate, after one of the meetings I was talking to
Sally Ride about my experiences investigating the engines
and the avionics, and I noticed that she didn't seem to
know about the special report I had written—the one Mr.
Keel told me he would show to everybody. So I said to Mr.
Keel, "Sally hasn't seen my report."
He says to his secretary, "Oh, make a copy of Mr.
Feynman's report and give it to Ms. Ride."
Then I discovered Mr. Acheson hadn't seen it.
"Make a copy and give it to Mr. Acheson."
I finally caught on, so I said, "Mr. Keel, I don't think
anybody has seen my report."
So he said to his secretary, "Make a copy for all the
commissioners and give it to them."
Then I said, "I thought you told me you showed it to
everybody."
"I meant I showed it to the entire staff."
Needless to say, when I asked the members of the staff
about it, none of them had seen it either.
When the commissioners read my report, all of them
thought there was a lot of good stuff in it, and it ought to be
in the commission report somewhere. But we couldn't
discuss it, because all we were doing was this wordsmith-
ing stuff on what was already written—not adding
anything new. We were working on the summary report
for the President—I'll call it the main report—which was
relatively brief. Later, as backup data and other informa-
tion, we were going to put out a series of appendices. So, I
thought, there are two possibilities for my report. It could
be in the main report—but it would have to be rewritten in
that case, because the style of the main report was
different—or it could be put out later as an appendix.
Although some of the members felt strongly that it
ought to go in the main report, I thought I'd compromise,
and let it go in as an appendix. But in order to get my re-
port in as an appendix, it had to be put into the document
system computer, which was quite elaborate and very
good, but different from the computer system I had
written my report on at home. They had an optical
scanner for transferring it, so I asked them to do that, and
they said, "Of course."
I'd go away for a while, and when I'd come back, it
would be lost. But I kept pushing on it, watching it,
nursing it along, and I finally got it through to the point
where it was, at last, in the hands of a real editor, a capable
man by the name of Hansen, who changed all my whiches
to thats and thats to whiches.
Mr. Hansen fixed up my report without changing the
sense of it. Then Mr. Keel fixed it up so it could go in as an
appendix: He put all kinds of big circles around whole
sections, with Xs through them; there were all kinds of
thoughts left out. He explained to me that my report was
repetitious with the main report, and I argued that it's
much easier to read something that's all together, and
because it was going to be an appendix, repetition didn't
matter.
Recommendations to President
Finally, the commission had its last meeting. It was about
the recommendations we would make to the President.
We made nine recommendations. The next day, I'm
standing around in Mr. Rogers's office when he says, "I
thought we would add a tenth recommendation: 'The
commission strongly recommends that NASA continue to
receive the support of the Administration and the
nation. . . . ' " In our four months of work as a commission,
we had never discussed that issue. It wasn't in our
directive from the President. We were only to look at the
accident, find out what caused it and make recommenda-
tions to avoid such accidents in the future.
So I thought this tenth recommendation wasn't
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appropriate and said so. We argued back and forth a little
bit, but then I had to catch a plane to New York, where I
was going for the weekend. While I was in the airplane, I
thought about it some more, and the more I thought about
it, the more I thought what a mistake it looks like—just
like one of the NASA reports, like the one I had seen back
at the beginning, with the contradictory bullets: There's
all these troubles, but in the end we recommend to keep on
flying!
I knew I didn't like it. Furthermore, we hadn't
discussed it at a meeting! It was just Mr. Rogers's idea. I
didn't want to call up Mr. Rogers and argue with him on
the telephone, so I quietly and thoughtfully wrote out a let-
ter to him, carefully explaining why I didn't like the tenth
recommendation. To make sure it got there right away, I
dictated my letter over the telephone to Mr. Rogers's
secretary, who typed it up and handed it to him right in his
office!
When I came back from New York, Mr. Rogers told
me that he had read my letter. He said he agreed with it,
but that I was outvoted.
I said, "How was I outvoted, when there was no
meeting?" I thought my ideas about this were worth
discussing with the other commissioners, and I wanted to
know what they thought about my arguments.
"I know, but I called each one of them up," he said,
"and they've all agreed. They've all voted for it."
So I said, "Well, I'd like a copy of this recommenda-
tion," and I went off to make a copy of it. When I came
back, Mr. Keel said he forgot that they hadn't talked to
Mr. Hotz—Mr. Hotz was there, you see, so I could ask him
right away. They forgot that they hadn't talked to Mr.
Hotz. I went to lunch with Mr. Acheson and Mr. Hotz, and
it seemed like Mr. Hotz agreed with me. When we went
back to Mr. Rogers's office, Mr. Acheson explained to me,
"It's only 'motherhood and apple pie.' If this were a
commission for the National Academy of Sciences, your
objections would be proper. But since this is a Presidential
commission, we should say something for the President."
"I don't understand the difference," I said. (Being
naive at the right time is often a good idea.) "I just don't
understand. Why can't I be careful and scientific when
I'm writing a report to the President?" (Being naive
doesn't always work: My argument had no effect.)
I was very concerned by all this, and I came home for a
while, very disturbed. I then got the idea—which I hadn't
had before—to call up some of the other commissioners.
I'll call them A, B and C.
I call A. He says, "What tenth recommendation?"
I call B. He says, "Tenth recommendation? What are
you talking about?"
I call C. He says, "Don't you remember, you dope? I
was in the office when Rogers first told us, and I don't see
anything wrong with it."
Although some of the commissioners agreed with the
tenth recommendation, I still thought we should have
discussed it in a meeting. I had also been railroaded into
modifying my report, even though it was going to appear
only as an appendix. I talked to my sister, who used to
work in Washington.
She said, "Well, if they do that to your report, what
happens to all the work you did on the commission? Your
contribution wouldn't be seen. It would appear as if you
didn't do anything."
I said, "Aha!" and I sent a telegram to Mr. Rogers:
PLEASE TAKE MY SIGNATURE OFF THE FRONT PAGE OF THE
REPORT UNLESS TWO THINGS OCCUR: 1) THERE IS NO
TENTH RECOMMENDATION, AND 2) MY REPORT APPEARS
AS AN APPENDIX WITHOUT MODIFICATION FROM VERSION
#23 OF MR. HANSEN.
I knew by this time I had to define everything
carefully! (By the way, everything had 23 versions. It has
been noted that computers, which are supposed to increase
the speed at which we do things, have not increased the
speed at which we write reports. We used to make only
three versions—because they're so hard to type—and now
we make 23 versions!)
The result of this telegram was that Mr. Rogers and
Mr. Keel tried to compromise. They asked General
Kutyna to be the intermediary, because they knew he was
a friend of mine. What a good friend of mine he was, they
didn't know.
The general calls me up, and right away he says,
"Hello, professor! Let me first tell you, I'm with you. But
I've been given the job of convincing you to change your
mind, and I have to give you all the arguments."
"Fear not!" I said. "I'm not gonna change my mind.
Just give me the arguments, and fear not."
So he gave me all the arguments, none of which had
any effect. The arguments were all kinds of crazy things.
For example, "If you don't accept the tenth recommenda-
tion, they're not going to accept the compromise they
already made about putting your report in as an appen-
dix." I didn't worry about that one, because I didn't have
to sign the main report, and I could always put out my re-
port by myself.
Another argument was that they noticed I was always
talking to the press and they would claim I was doing this
as a publicity stunt to sell more copies of my book. That
one made me smile, because I could imagine the laughter
it would produce from my friends at home. I knew that no-
body I cared about would believe it.
But finally, I did compromise. I said, "Instead of
making it a recommendation, just make it a concluding
thought and change the wording from 'strongly recom-
mends' to simply 'urges.' "
They accepted that.
A little bit later, Mr. Keel calls me up: "Can we say
'strongly urges'?"
I said, "No. Just 'urges.' "
Meeting with press
So I put my name on the main report, my report got in as
an appendix, and everything was all right. We gave our
report to the President on a Thursday in a ceremony at the
White House in the Rose Garden. The report was not to be
publicized until Monday, so the President could study it.
During those three days the newspaper reporters
were working like demons. They knew the report was
finished, and they were trying to scoop each other to find
out what was in it. They kept calling me up because I had
been so cooperative before. I told my secretary to say that
I had no comment on anything; I would answer all their
questions on Tuesday at my news conference.
Well, I didn't know it, but someone had leaked that
this argument had gone on. The only man who knew
about it, I think, was Mr. Hotz. He may have thought it
would help me in pushing my point, but for whatever
reason, it leaked. Some paper in Miami started it, and
soon the story was running all over about this argument
between me and Mr. Rogers. So when the reporters called
me up, they'd get the message, "He has nothing to say;
he'll answer all your questions at his press conference on
Tuesday."
That sounded very suspicious, so my press conferece
turned out to be very popular. That's what most of the
questions at the news conference were about. So I found
myself repeating that I don't have any problem with Mr.
Rogers.
My reaction is that I like him, and that he's a
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genuinely fine fellow. But I reserve in my head the
possibility—not as a suspicion, but as an unknown—that I
like him because he's such a good politician that he knew
how to make me like him. I prefer to assume he is the way
he appears. But as a scientist, I'm not sure that my
evidence is complete. And I was in Washington long
enough to know that I can't tell.
Summing up
Finally, I would like to say something about the general
deterioration of NASA—and the fact that there was no
information coming up from the engineers to the manage-
ment. Just the other day I was reading a book by Harvey
Brooks in which he talked about innovation. He ex-
plained that innovation doesn't have to be the direct
invention of a machine; an innovation could be the way
things are made, such as the Ford mass production line
or, as in another of his examples, the management system
developed at NASA for the Apollo program, which
involved the cooperation of so many contractors and
subcontractors. The system they evolved was an innova-
tion, a great development. This was more than 20 years
ago. But in the meantime, something happened that
happens to many human innovations—it deteriorated.
The question is: How and why? I don't know.
I invented a theory, which I have discussed with a
considerable number of people, and many people have
explained to me why my theory is wrong. But I don't
remember their explanations as to why it's wrong—you
never can, because that's the way you're built! I am a
weak human, too, so I cannot resist telling you what I
think is the problem.
When NASA was trying to go to the Moon, it was a
goal that everyone was eager to achieve. Everybody was
cooperating, much like the efforts to build the first atomic
bomb at Los Alamos. There was no problem between the
management and the other people, because they were all
trying to do the same thing. But then, after going to the
Moon, NASA had all these people together, all these
institutions and so on. You don't want to fire people and
send them out in the street when you're done. So the
problem is what to do.
You have to convince Congress that there exists a
project this organization can do. In order to do so, it is nec-
essary (at least it was apparently necessary in this case) to
exaggerate—to exaggerate how economical the shuttle
was going to be, to exaggerate the big scientific facts that
would be discovered. (In every newspaper article about
the shuttle there was a statement about the useful zero-
gravity experiments—such as making Pharmaceuticals,
new alloys and so on—on board, but I've never seen in any
science article any results of anything that have ever come
out of any of those science experiments which were so
important*.) So NASA exaggerated how little the shuttle
would cost, they exaggerated how often it could fly, to such
a pitch that it was obviously incorrect—obvious enough
that all kinds of organizations were writing reports, trying
to get the Congress to wake up to the fact that NASA's
claims weren't true.
I believe that what happened was—remember, this is
only a theory, because I tell you, people don't agree—that
although the engineers down in the works knew NASA's
claims were impossible, and the guys at the top knew that
somehow they had exaggerated, the guys at the top didn't
want to hear that they had exaggerated. They didn't want
to hear about the difficulties of the engineers—the fact
that the shuttle can't fly so often, the fact that it might not
work and so on. It's better if they don't hear it, so they can
be much more "honest" when they're trying to get
Congress to OK their projects.
So my theory is that the loss of common interest—
between the engineers and scientists on the one hand and
management on the other—is the cause of the deteriora-
tion in cooperation, which, as you've seen, produced a
calamity.
* * *
A slightly different version of this article, edited by Ralph
Leighton, appeared in the Fall 1987 issue ofCalteeh s Engineering
and Science magazine. The article is reprinted here by permission
of the Caltech Alumni Association. •
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